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Case No. 20080933 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Victor Clinton, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetine in a 
prison or jail, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not seeking to suppress the 
methamphetamine, and did the trial court commit plain error in not sua sponte 
suppressing it? 
Standard of Review. "When a question of trial counsel effectiveness is raised 
for the first time on appeal and the review is confined to the trial court record, the 
question of ineffectiveness of counsel is a matter of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554 (Utah App. 1993); see also State v. 
Perry, 2009 UT App 51, | 9,204 R3d 880. " [D]efendant bears the burden of assuring 
the record is adequate" to review his claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Litlierland, 
2000 UT 76, Tf 16,12 P.3d 92. "To prevail under plain error review, a defendant 
must demonstrate that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, f^ 17, 
174 P.3d 628 (quotation marks and case citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a prison or 
jail, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (West 
2004). Rl. The trial court subsequently amended the charge to a third degree 
felony. See R89; R157:129,131-32,144. Following a one-day jury trial, Defendant 
was convicted as charged. R138-39. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an 
enhanced, indeterminate prison term of from one-to-fifteen years. R144-45. 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R150. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Officer Evans of the Ogden City Police Department was patrolling 20th and 
Washington Boulevard at approximately 4:30 a.m. on 1 August 2007, when he saw 
two men walk into an alley behind Boulevard Automotive. R157:97. The alley is 
poorly lit and runs between the automotive shop and Deseret Industries. Id. Officer 
Evans observed that the shorter of the two men, Defendant, was carrying "what 
looked to [him] like a crowbar. It was a very short—a few feet long— curved object, 
a metallic reflection and the bottom of it was kind of curved forward/7 Id. 
Defendant "was carrying it in his hand, walking," and also lifted it up to his 
shoulder. Id. Officer Evans was concerned about a possible burglary because of the 
high-crime location, and the early morning hour. Id. Before approaching the men, 
he called for backup, "because he knew he would need someone there." Id. at 98. 
Upon contacting the two men, Officer Evans "noticed that the object in 
[Defendant's] hands was actually a —an adjustable cane that was set at a very low 
setting, and the curved tip was the tip that had been worn down." Id. When Officer 
Evans asked what the men were doing in that area at that hour, they told him that 
1
 Defendant recites the evidence in the light most favorable to his version of 
events. In keeping with well-established appellate practice, this brief recites the 
facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, \ 
2,520,114 P.3d 551; State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60,1f 2,6 P.3d 1116; State v. Gordon, 913 
P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
3 
"they were on their way to PetroMart to get some coffee, but PetroMart is not open 
24 hours and it's 4:30 in the morning/, Id, at 98-99. Officer Evans obtained 
identification from the men. Id. at 98. A warrants check revealed that both had 
outstanding warrants. Id. at 99-100. Officer Evans arrested the other man, while 
backup Officer Gardner arrested Defendant. Id. at 100,109. Both men were frisked 
and transported to the Weber County Jail. Id. at 101. The men were searched again, 
"just outside the jail doors,... just in case we missed a weapon/' Id. at 110. Officer 
Gardner cautioned Defendant that it was a felony to take drugs into the jail. Id. at 
111. Defendant did not respond or otherwise indicate that he had drugs on his 
person. Id. at 111. 
Officer Evans was present while Defendant was searched in the booking area. 
Id. at 101. This more thorough jail search revealed a small bindle or baggy in 
Defendant's shirt pocket, which contained a white crystal substance. Id. at 102,112, 
117. The substance tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 124-25. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not move 
to suppress the methamphetamine found during a jail search, and that the trial court 
committed plain error in not doing so sua sponte. Defendant claims to have a 
meritorious Fourth Amendment issue here because Officer Evans demanded and 
4 
retained his identification for a warrants check, absent reasonable suspicion. 
However, the record does not support Defendant's characterization of the 
encounter. Officer Evans affirmed that he obtained Defendant's identification, but 
the record is silent as to whether he obtained the identification via consent or 
command. The record is also silent as to whether the officer retained the 
identification or immediately returned it to Defendant, moved away from 
Defendant or ran the warrants check in Defendant's immediate presence. 
Defendant did not move to remand under Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, to develop evidence in support of his claim. Defendant can therefore 
only speculate that the voluntary encounter escalated to a detention, or that any 
motion to suppress would have been successful on that ground. This is insufficient 
as a matter of law to establish deficient performance. Defendant's claim of 
ineffectiveness must therefore be rejected. 
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ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE IN NOT SEEKING TO SUPPRESS THE 
METHAMPHETAMINE, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN NOT SUA SPONTE SUPPRESSING IT 
On appeal, Defendant raises claims of ineffectiveness and plain error because 
trial counsel did move to suppress methamphetamine found during a jail search, 
and because the trial court did not do so sua sponte. Aplt. Br. at 12-26. However, 
the record is ambiguous and does not support Defendant's claim that the voluntary 
encounter escalated to a detention requiring reasonable suspicion. Defendant's 
unsupported claims of ineffectiveness and plain error and must therefore be 
rejected. 
A, Defendant has not, and cannot, show ineffectiveness. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both 
prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which holds that 
such claims succeed only if the defendant shows: (1) that his counsel's performance 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. 668,687-688 (1984); see also State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810,814 (Utah App. 1994). Failure to establish either prong defeats a 
claim of ineffectiveness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. 
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A defendant "raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim carries a 
'iuc; > ^: .v_: , c , f . /cc / ,2- :F .?d 1036,1046(106101. 2002). There > a 
'V.:i ' •" ^'•.,^ " . , . , or.^uc: ; - ^ \w.4&:., Lie wide rr.n?/" of 
reasonable rroi' NV: : .; - ' -*. -. • • - ' '
 1( lim I I ^, .it <i8q, " 1 his presumption 
derives from our common experience that ar * \ - • ; • - — \ • -p 
their clients in a professional, competent, and reasonable manner/' BuUorl ^ r r " • 
° > f J i J - • Accordingly, this Court "will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness 
presented to it is supporteu ;.-, .I.J the relevant evidence of 'which defendant is 
*<•-•' •'-•/ :.. - . - . _ . j .: . >,\ei e the record appears 
inadequate in c.r- : -1 •" •'••• • - k-rL * ~ : -.•: -^--5 meivirom simply 
will be construed in favor of a finding that c«. <u: * -i - • - ] • *•*• •> •;; - ! . /. 
Indeed, '"proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a specuht^. T -
but must >„ d demonstrable reality/" Mc/xo/Zs v. State, 2009 UT12, ^ 36,203 P.3d 976 
# :-c /...;:.:: t\ u J*, Z o r\~a Lvu, 877 (Utah 1993)). Counsel's failure "to 
mak. "- •- • -• *.
 ; .-j : ; ._ - :i I\;;>LOI ^oes not constitute 
ineffective assistance/7 State vA\liiit!r ' :°,:M T'| o.^  « Vi w<u:\-\-;\ ..:^.u:.. ^ns^nd 
citations omitted). 
Here, Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not mo vine; to 
-^ J ppi'L'is i; le methamphetamine found on his person during a jail search. However, 
failing to file a motion to suppress does not necessarily fall outside the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,384 
(1986) ("[W]e agree with petitioner's view that the failure to file a suppression 
motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel/7). Defendant 
cannot prevail without showing "that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious 
and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different 
absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice/7 Id. at 375. 
Id. Defendant has not made, and cannot make, this showing on this record. 
Defendant cannot show that he has a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim 
here, because the record is ambiguous. Defendant acknowledges that the encounter 
"started off as a level-one stop/7 and that "Officer Evans had the right to approach 
the Defendant and ask for his name and a brief explanation as to why he was there.77 
Aplt. Br. at 21, 23. However, according to Defendant, Officer Evans escalated the 
initial voluntary encounter to a detention "by requiring the Defendant to produce his 
driver's license for examination,77 and thereafter "'confiscating] the Defendant's 
driver's license and detaining] him while he searched for outstanding warrants.77 
Aplt. Br. at 23 (emphasis added). Defendant's characterization of Officer Evans as 
variously demanding, requiring, and confiscating his identification, and thereafter 
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detaining him for a warrants check, see Aplt. Br. at 21-23, is not supported in the 
record. 
I'm example, Oiiicer hvans aliunvcl u m .:*.:. i c J\orain[ed] identification 
from hilh indi\ iduals." R157:^w . . «.s npver asked whether he 
obtained the identifications volun fa rilv ni ,»s the ingulf if nioixhM'Mivomnicind. itir 
see also id. at 105-107. If the officer merely requested the identifications liv request 
did not convert the voluntary encounter to a detention. See Florida v. Bostiek, 501 
I. > .s. 42"), 4:b ; 4W (i L^J); see also State v, Hansen, 2002 UT 1 25, H 37, r3 P.3d 650, 437 
| I W H . ' . ' • ' • • . ' . . • • • . 
;
 ' - '•* - — - \ ' ' - r r) ~" V* • : ..\ ;\i\? -tepped awav ;ror.i :n.e 
men to run the warrants check, how long it h u il • in I whether th** olfieer tetain^d 
the identifications for the duration of the check, or immediately ret i irned 1 1 len i If 
the officer did not step avvav. or if the warrants check took only 30-60 seconds, or 
the officer quickly returned the identifications before the check was completed, the 
*
 fj
"^ -*
1 x
^ .:" * . .i - , i-jbLaiaL^ t*1 a L.cLru*'n. See State v, Adams, 
9 
2007 UT App 117,1f 11-14,158 P.3d 1134 (distinguishing Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 
UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274).2 
These uncertainties render the record ambiguous. Yet Defendant has never 
sought remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to develop 
supporting evidence. His failure to do so reasonably suggests that the encounter 
remained consensual, or that there is no supporting evidence to develop. See 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 16 (citing Utah R. App. P. 23B and observing that "[i]f a 
defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in 
the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
2
 Even assuming the encounter did escalate to a detention, there was 
reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Defendant and his companion for a warrants 
check. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Although what Officer Evans originally 
perceived to be a crowbar turned out to be a cane, the encounter occurred in a 
poorly lit alley between two closed businesses in high crime area of downtown 
Ogden at 4:30 a.m. R157:98-99. Defendant and his companion also responded 
suspiciously when questioned as to their presence in the area at that hour— they 
could not have purchased coffee at PetroMart because it was then closed. Id. 
Alternatively, however, even if there was detention absent reasonable 
suspicion, the discovery of the outstanding warrants constitutes an intervening 
circumstance that attenuated the taint of the alleged unlawful detention. See People 
v. Brendlin, 195 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Cal. 2008) (adopting majority view that "the 
discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant prior to a search incident to arrest 
constitutes an intervening circumstance that may — and, in the absence of purposeful 
or flagrant police misconduct, will — attenuate the taint of the antecedent unlawful 
traffic stop"). 
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ineffective/ defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a 
le.nporary remand'' ). 
-.. . : .^ >._'/: : i ; j . . . , . . ..; a;.. has a meritorious Jrourth Amendment 
claim. IJ'' "• • ^ • : M^ -•.•-- —L a-inampnetamine 
found a: ihe juu would iiave been buccec~** : - : - • • 
"inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom - ; r~ ••" 
will be construed in f:n r ^f a finding that counsel, performed effectively/7 
.
 (p:n\. •;. ~Mv i ^ ienu,;nt thus necessarily fails to show ihat t:*al 
* •• '-^"d^r-'J :-••-• • *.:» ... *u .-.M: rvrtormance. ; ;.r inericctivenessclaim 
must therefore r * ^ ^ ~ci.' ' v- Ci- > ! • . ->*- < - '" 
B. ^-eiendam ha- nul, and cannot, show plain en 
To esuirn.vi
 riuin crrr^, a defendant rcu^i -how "that the trial court 
i •'* a"" • c -:.<.; •". ; :. u. , '««.:.- L OLH oc\ u•-.;., ;;iiu pivjuCii^icu. ' :*tatc v. Cruz, 2005 UT 
45, j^ 24,122 P VI r"4^ [f eifhei pron^ is unmet the oil KM" need not be addressed. See 
State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993). For the same reason that Defendant 
failed to show ;hat trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress, no taio to ^how thai the I rial court committed plain error in not sua 
K -,:i:. -upp:e^::.c, :nc n;cu;^;vcnetainine. bee State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 
(Utah App. 1994) (error that should have been "plain to the court, should also have 
been plain to trial counsel"), vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). 
As shown in Point LA., supra, the record does not support Defendant's claim 
that his voluntary encounter with Officer Evans ever escalated to a detention. 
Indeed, given the record ambiguities and deficiencies, the presumption must be that 
it did not escalate. Defendant thus fails to show that any error occurred here, let 
alone an obvious and prejudicial error. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f^ 24. Defendant's 
plain error claim must therefore be rejected. Id.; see also Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 21 September 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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